Binding Fictions. Contradicting Facts and Judicial Constraints in a Narcotics Case in Himachal Pradesh by Berti, Daniela
HAL Id: hal-02321020
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02321020
Submitted on 20 Oct 2019
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Binding Fictions. Contradicting Facts and Judicial
Constraints in a Narcotics Case in Himachal Pradesh
Daniela Berti
To cite this version:
Daniela Berti. Binding Fictions. Contradicting Facts and Judicial Constraints in a Narcotics Case in
Himachal Pradesh. Berti, Daniela and Bordia, Devika. Regimes of Legality. Ethnography of Criminal
Cases in South Asia, Oxford University Press, pp.91 - 128, 2015, 978-0-19-908547-7. ￿hal-02321020￿
 [Published in Daniela Berti & Devika Bordia (eds), Regimes of Legality. 
Ethnography of Criminal Cases in South Asia, pp. 91-128. New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 2015.] 
 
 
 
/p.91/ 
 
Binding Fictions.  
Contradicting Facts and Judicial Constraints in a 
Narcotics Case in Himachal Pradesh* 
  
Daniela Berti  
 
 
 
 
Anoop Chitkara is considered by the High Court judges in Himachal 
Pradesh to be one of the top lawyers specializing in narcotic cases. I first 
met Chitkara in the corridor of the High Court building after the judges of 
the court I was attending had decided to take a break. I was told by a 
judge that this lawyer had been invited to take part in a twoday 
conference on the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, or 
NDPS Act, which was about to take place in Shimla in March 2010 on the 
initiative of the Judicial Academy. Apparently, this was the first time that 
a lawyer had been invited to give a paper at a meeting of this kind, where 
speakers were usually chosen from high-ranking judges or advocate 
generals along with various experts on the topic in question. As I was still 
unsure whether the Chief Justice, the head of the Academy, would allow 
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 me to attend the event, I was curious to /p.92/ glean something about the 
paper that Chitkara was going to present at the conference.  
Smiling at my question, the lawyer told me that he was still working on 
his paper, although he was rather sceptical about achieving a positive 
outcome from the conference, which, as the Chief Justice had announced, 
was intended ‘to improve the quality of investigations of NDPS cases’.1 
He pointed out that in India, despite the extremely stringent nature of 
narcotic legislation, those accused were usually acquitted. These 
acquittals, he said, were mainly due to procedural mistakes made by the 
police during investigations as well as to contradictions that emerged 
during the trial between the way the police replied to the questions about 
how investigations had been conducted and what had previously been 
written in the police report. The paper he planned to present at the 
conference would thus throw light on the essential steps that the police 
had to follow so that prosecutors would be able to prove their cases. ‘As a 
lawyer,’ he told me, ‘I defend all these people who become involved in a 
narcotics case. Who better than me to tell the judges about the way to 
improve the quality of investigations in such cases?’  
However strange the idea of a defence lawyer helping the police to 
improve their investigation might appear, Chitkara did not seem worried 
about this. ‘I am going to place all my cards on the table, and then we’ll 
see if they get me, but they won’t’, he said confidently. Indeed, he was 
fully convinced that regardless of the clues passed on to the other side, he 
would continue to win cases. The reason for his self-assurance went hand 
in hand with his complete mistrust of the police, whom he considered to 
be incompetent, sometimes corrupt, and constantly coming up with 
‘fabricated stories’. ‘They present these stories as the truth, but they never 
tell the truth’, he concluded.  
Although Chitkara accused the police of not telling the truth, he did not 
mean that people in the area, including his clients, were not involved in 
narcotic trafficking and that the police always incriminated innocent 
people. Though this is the official version that lawyers always present 
before a judge, his discourse implies something else. It refers to the notion 
of the police’s concern about providing the court with an ‘ideal’ report that 
does not exactly correspond to how investigations are carried out in the 
field. According to this discourse, which is commonly upheld in court 
circles, an element of fiction is introduced by the police /p.93/ in their 
report which is due to police efforts to show that they have duly followed 
the relevant procedures, even in cases where they have not done so. This 
element of fiction would inevitably lead police officers to lie or to 
contradict one another when cross-examined during the trial, and would 
consequently undermine their credibility before the court. The tendency of 
police officers to provide an idealized and thus untrue report of the 
investigations was also often put forward by judges, which is probably the 
reason why they decided to invite a defence lawyer— hence someone 
used to finding contradictions in police reports—to take part in the NDPS 
workshop.  
The problem of truth is ever present in criminal cases not only in 
relation to the version of events written by the police at the time of the 
investigations, but also in reference to the testimony provided by 
witnesses during the trial. Judges and prosecutors alike always complain 
that most witnesses called to the bar by the prosecutor to support the 
accusation will eventually lie for the benefit of the accused, denying what 
they said in their previous statements.  
In this chapter, I will base my findings on a case study I followed at a 
Session Court in a district of Himachal Pradesh to examine the notions of 
truth and untruth that were put forward by its protagonists. The analyses 
of court dialogues in both oral and written forms show how the lawyer’s 
defence strategy consists in demolishing the police’s credibility and in 
presenting another fictional version of the story, which is suggested 
during the trial itself through cross-examination techniques. Unlike the 
way in which the police compile the investigative report, the lawyer’s 
story does not have to follow procedural rules or legal provisions. Instead, 
it relies on a more intuitive scenario that was commonly used in the court 
cases I observed in Himachal Pradesh, according to which the accused is 
falsely implicated in a case by a family member or by someone from his or 
her village. In the case presented here, the plausibility of this counter-story 
was not immediately evident to the court but came across at the end of a 
long process during which the defence lawyer challenged the veracity of 
every detail of the police account. I will show how the version strategically 
proposed by the defence lawyer became legally plausible when the police 
version of the case had gradually lost its credibility in the eyes of the 
judge. The defence’s story, though constantly reduced to strategic fiction 
by both the prosecutor and the judge in the initial stages of the trial, 
eventually prevailed at the /p.94/ end of the trial and was used in part by 
the judge to back his decision to acquit the accused.  
The analyses of the interactions that took place during the hearings will 
be discussed here with reference to the notion of ‘binding’, which in court 
studies denotes a legal procedure according to which a statement ‘must 
confront past statements, generating inconsistency and contradiction’ 
(Scheffer 2007: 5). The notion of binding regularly emerges in Indian trials 
when a witness’s statement is considered to have more or less evidentiary 
value according to specific procedural rules. Furthermore, the case 
discussed here shows how the issue of binding is related to a constant shift 
between writing and orality in an Indian judicial setting and, more 
specifically, to the extent to which an oral testimony and its written 
equivalents are likely to be considered admissible evidence by the court. 
In this chapter, I examine how the court manages to deal with 
contradictory oral and written versions of a story and how greater 
evidentiary value is attributed to one of these versions. I also address the 
fictional aspects of the trial proceedings by considering the ways in which 
the judge, the police, and the prosecutor discuss the case out of court.  
However, before introducing the case study, and in order to contex-
tualize the court dialogues, I provide a more general view of the ways in 
which narcotic issues are discussed and perceived in government and 
judiciary milieus as well as by society at large.  
 
Formal Meetings and Local Discourse    
 
After my conversation with Anoop Chitkara, it turned out that the 
Chief Justice had no objections to my attending the conference at the 
Judiciary Academy; he even came to welcome me personally during the 
coffee break. The style of the conference was rather formal; though the 
speakers were all from the Higher Judiciary, the audience was made up of 
district judges and prosecutors, young trainee judges, high-ranking police 
officers, and forestry officials, as well as a few journalists seated in the 
middle of the room.2
 
 
During the workshop, narcotic cases were assessed from an interna-
tional perspective. Judges reminded attendees that the actual source of 
narcotic trafficking in Himachal Pradesh comes from outside the country 
itself, evoking ‘narco-tourism’ from Israel and European  countries or 
/p.95/ ‘narco-terrorists’. Drug-trafficking experts had been invited to 
heighten junior judges’ awareness of the dangers of drug use and of the 
means by which drugs produced in India circulate on the international 
market. Discussions were mostly geared towards improving the 
performance of the police and prosecution services by providing advice on 
technical issues or suggesting strategies to avoid errors that commonly 
prevent judges from taking the decision to convict the accused.  
One of the first speakers at the workshop was Justice Deepak Gupta 
who at that time was appointed to Himachal Pradesh High Court after 
having spent part of his career as a High Court lawyer. Deepak Gupta is a 
very modern, efficient judge and well aware of the need to speed up court 
proceedings and to computerize the court system. He regularly updated 
the court website himself and posted his own judgments online. His 
favourite expressions were ‘constitution’, ‘human rights’, and ‘the rule of 
law’. At the workshop, he began his speech by analyzing what he 
considered to be the commonest reason why prosecutors lose narcotic 
cases in India, stating his viewpoint that ‘if you follow the system, the 
prosecution cannot fail’. One of his major criticisms was addressed to the 
‘investigative agency’, that is to the police; as Chitkara had done, he 
remarked that police officers were mistaken in believing that they were 
required to proceed according to the Act, which resulted in their falsifying 
their reports. By way of an example, he cited an occasion when the police 
had claimed that a case was registered on the spot at night in the glow of a 
scooter’s headlamp, yet the defence lawyer had shown that the documents 
were so neatly written that they had obviously been drafted at the police 
station. ‘Why can’t you say that there was not enough space there, that it 
was dark and so we moved to an office?’ he bust out with, addressing the 
few senior police officers sitting in the room.  
Justice Gupta put forward another common mistake where police 
officers who make ‘a search’ in a private house systemically include the 
name of a senior officer who allegedly took part in a raid merely in order 
to respect the requirement defined in the Narcotic Act. He noted that he 
had encountered this problem a number of times in the past two weeks, 
explaining,  
 
When the constable gets the information, the senior says, ‘Go and take my 
name!’ [as if he had been with him]. Now what happens is that when the 
senior becomes linked to the operation, the search is already over, and 
when he is cross-examined in court, he cannot give even the slightest 
/p.96/ description of the building where the search took place or of the 
people involved in the search, clearly showing that he had never been 
there.  
Turning to the prosecutors, the judge blamed them for withdrawing all 
too quickly a case when they see witnesses turn hostile or for not taking 
the time to cross-examine them. He also held the magistrates and session 
judges responsible for frequently omitting in their transcription of the 
evidence many important facts that emerge during hearings and which 
need to be recorded in the court report as they may be relevant to revision 
of the case by the appeal judge.  
Gupta’s paper, like the others scheduled for that day, reflected the 
superior position from which High Court judges address both members of 
the lower judiciary and the police. By contrast, in his concluding words 
the judge congratulated Anoop Chitkara, the aforementioned High Court 
lawyer, for the paper he was about to present, which Gupta had already 
had the opportunity to read. He described the paper as a wonderful 
checklist for police officers and worthy of being printed and distributed to 
every policeman to ensure that they are in a position to prove a case. 
Chitkara was visibly flattered by the judge’s comments about his paper, 
the preparation of which had occupied his junior assistants for several 
days. The lawyer then embarked on a point-by-point discussion on the 
many technical procedures the police were required to follow in order to 
provide prosecutors with the chance to prove their cases. He associated 
the ‘technicality’ of the Narcotic Act with ‘the need to protect innocent 
citizens from being falsely implicated in a narcotic case’ (Chitkara 2010). 
He also referred to the possibility that a false case could be made against a 
villager not only by one of his or her enemies, but also by police officers 
themselves in order to enter into negotiations with the accused.  
The discourse of a ‘possible misuse of the Narcotic Act’ is quite com-
monly made in the court milieu, not only by lawyers but also by judges. 
This is demonstrated in a speech delivered by Justice A. R. Lakshmanan at 
another workshop of the Narcotic Act organized by the Judiciary 
Academy in 2008. In his paper, Lakshmanan highlighted the contrast 
between the severity of the Narcotic Act and the fact that during some 
festivals, such as Holi, a cannabis-based preparation (bhang) is used freely 
before the eyes of police officers, because it is considered to be a 
traditional local beverage. According to the judge, however, ‘nothing 
could prevent the police from making arrests and throwing everyone at a 
Holi party into jail’ (Lakshmanan 2008:55). Indeed, this appeared /p.97/ to 
him to be a good way for politicians and others to get rid of their enemies. 
The judge concluded by noting how many innocent people ‘languish in 
jail indefinitely […] after ganja [cannabis] has been deliberately planted in 
their household or belongings [by connivers in the police force].’ 
(Lakshmanan 2008: 55.)  
Lakshmanan’s reference to the cultural aspects of cannabis in the area is 
something of an exception, as these Academy workshops usually focus on 
legal procedures and penal sections. By contrast, villagers involved in the 
cultivation of cannabis strongly emphasize the cultural value attributed to 
cannabis, the cultivation of which, they say, is a traditional practice that 
has been maintained exclusively for domestic and religious purposes 
(Berti 2011). Local newspapers give a great deal of visibility to this 
discourse, often reporting that villagers consider cannabis cultivation to 
have been approved by their village deities. For example, an article 
appeared in The Tribune in 2004, entitled ‘Where devta tells them 
[villagers] to grow cannabis’ includes statements from a number of 
villagers, who claimed that ‘unless Jamlu god tells us to grow other crops, 
we will grow only cannabis’. Furthermore, the vice-president of Malana 
village, a place in the region famous for growing cannabis, is quoted as 
saying, ‘Cannabis has been grown here since time immemorial’.3
 
 
Other newspapers report on villagers' discourses that criticize the 
criminalization of cannabis activities. The article Hardships Multiply for 
Cannabis Growers is representative of the kind of discourse reported in the 
press. The same journalist, Kuldeep Chauhan, refers to the way villagers 
consider the anti-cannabis Act as 'city-centric anti-villager law'. He writes 
about young girls who were asked by their parents ‘to give up their 
studies as the anti-cannabis team has destroyed their only source of 
income.’ He refers to Mand Das, a ward member of the panchayat 
complaining that ‘we can’t grow cannabis, the traditional source of 
handicrafts and staple food [though] our ancestors have survived on these 
two sources of livelihood down the centuries’ (The Tribune, 6 October 
2005). 4  The problem villagers have with the Narcotic Act is often 
presented as being linked to the policy regarding forest protection. The 
article reports, for example, how villagers belonging to the Great 
Himalayan National Parks area complain that their traditional practice of 
collecting herbs from the forest is now banned. The journalist explicitly 
takes the defence of the ‘poor villagers’ against the implementation /p.98/ 
of the law, reproaching forestry and police officials for not providing 
‘convincing answers.’ (The Tribune, 6 October 2005)  
Nevertheless, this local discourse has to be regarded as only part of the 
picture. As Molly (2001) underlines, for the last forty years cannabis 
cultivation has been under the control of national and international 
dealers whose only concern is to sell the product on foreign drug markets. 
The discourse on the ‘traditional’ use of cannabis also appears to 
contradict the fact that, in some cases, fields previously reserved for 
ordinary crops have recently been turned into cannabis fields—and in 
most cases, this has been requested by outsiders. The domestic and 
religious use of cannabis may well persist, but a villager cultivating can-
nabis today does it, first and foremost, to reply to a market demand (Berti 
2011). The economic interest behind cannabis cultivation has even led 
villagers to develop some strategies in order to escape police control, such 
as sowing cannabis on woodland instead of private land so that nobody 
can be punished (The Tribune, 12 December 2005).  
Though supported by the press and sometimes referred to by lawyers 
in informal conversations, the ongoing discourse about the cultural and 
religious importance of cannabis, is never used as a ‘defence argument’ 
inside the courtroom where narcotic cases are considered to be extremely 
serious and are punishable by very harsh sentences. However, these social 
and cultural dynamics inevitably impact the proceedings of a trial, often 
leading all village-based witnesses to side with the accused. This is 
especially true in cases where cannabis has been discovered on the 
property of the accused, whether cultivated in a field or hidden in his or 
her house. The judicial process may also ultimately be hampered by 
recurrent procedural errors made by the police during the investigation, 
which often results in the total collapse of the prosecutor’s case. In order to 
analyze the interactions that took place during the trial I observed, I first 
examine various police documents included in the case file, which will 
help to introduce the case and to give some insight into the way 
investigations are reported before the court.  
 
 
Writing up the story    
 
Though never invoked before the judge, the discourse on the cultural 
and religious value of cannabis may be part of a preliminary version given 
by the accused before the case is taken up by the defence lawyer.  
/p.99/  
This was what happened in the case presented here, which was regis-
tered against Kishan Ram and his son Hari Chand5
 
under Section 20b of 
the Narcotic Act, which asserts that ‘whoever produces, manufactures, 
possesses, sells, purchases, transports, or uses cannabis shall be 
punishable by rigourous imprisonment for a term which may extend to 
ten years, and with a fi ne which may extend to one lakh [one hundred 
thousand] rupees’.  
In the FIR (First Information Report) for the case, the inspector noted 
the following:  
 
On [date], along with [seven police officers’ names], I went in the day 
squad, and at six o’clock I received secret information that the accused, 
Kishan Ram, and his son, of Rajput caste and of [village], were involved 
in cannabis trading at their residential house and the report was reliable. 
At this time, the village president Devi Varma was informed [about the 
raid that the police wanted to make] on her mobile. On her arrival, the 
report about the search warrant was prepared and the copy of this au-
thorization was sent to Constable Puran Chand of the criminal branch. 
Then, along with other officials, I went to the village of the accused and 
Kishan Ram was found at his house (Police diary).  
 
The opening passage of a FIR such as this provides information which 
is of legal relevance. During the trial, each police officer who appears 
before the judge as a prosecutor witness is asked to repeat, orally, all the 
details written in the document, which may include the number and 
names of the officers who took part in the operation, place names, 
procedures followed, their exact timetable, and so on. Based on these 
details, the defence lawyer looks for contradictions in the police officers' 
replies. In fact, police records not only ‘look backward at the events they 
describe, but they are also drawn up in anticipation of their prospective 
use by criminal law professionals’ (Komter 2006:202).  
In the case analysed here, the investigation reports were intended to 
fulfill the provisions indicated in the NDPS Act. Section 42 of the Act 
allows a police officer, superior in rank to a peon or constable, to possess 
the power ‘of entry, search, seizure, and arrest without warrant or 
authorization [from a magistrate]’. An officer is also given the right to 
keep the identity of his informant secret, even though he is obligated to 
write the so-called grounds of belief—a document explaining why he 
should be allowed to proceed with the search without applying to the 
court for a warrant—and send it to his superior officer within /p.100/ 
seventy-two hours of the search. To be more precise, an officer must 
justify why he believes that waiting for a warrant would provide ‘the 
opportunity for the concealment of evidence or facility for the escape of an 
offender’ (Section 42, NDPS Act). Despite the importance of this procedure 
in proving a case before the court, there are a number of instances in 
which police officers do not send the document in time or else draft it 
incorrectly, and defence lawyers regularly cite such mistakes as evidence 
that a false case has been invented against a client.  
After official registration of the case, the facts are recorded by the police 
in the so-called police diary, which covers the period of the investigations.6 
The police diary for the case I witnessed included results from the 
questioning of the accused, which was carried out to obtain further 
information about the other people involved in the case. The inspector 
wrote that the two accused ‘[were] not saying anything related to the 
case’; they were ‘clever’ (chalaka) and ‘of a criminal nature’ (apradhikism ke). 
The report also described how, after twenty-four hours in police custody, 
the men were brought before the magistrate for the police to apply for 
permission to detain the accused in jail for three more days:  
 
The accused have been brought before the judge, and the judge has heard 
both parties’ points of view and given his consent for three days in police 
custody. This time, the inspector and his colleagues have reached the jail 
with the accused. Food has been given to them and the guard is doing his 
duty. I, the inspector, am talking on the telephone to DSP Brijesh Sood of 
the crime branch.   
 
A summary was provided at the end of the diary which concluded by 
assuring the reader that ‘investigations into the case are underway, the file 
is being kept safe, and the report is being sent to the officers’.  
Total transparency is guaranteed through the existence of a written 
record. Although no reference was made in the diary to the way the 
questioning was conducted, the accused reportedly said that the cannabis 
found in their house ‘had been rubbed from the plants by their own 
hands, and [that] it had been kept in their house in order to be distributed 
as prasad (offerings) to baba and sadhu (ascetics) who were to come during 
the Shiva puja (worship)’. The version of events reported in the diary 
echoes the aforementioned cultural discourse about cannabis; the accused 
explained the presence of cannabis in their house using a religious/cultural 
argument, which implicitly led them to admit that cannabis was actually 
found in their house. This cultural argument /p.101/ also appears in the 
first documents presented before the court that were produced while the 
two men were being held in police custody and which describe how the 
inspector of police presented them both to a judicial magistrate to prolong 
the custody order on the grounds that the men refused to speak.7
 
 
Despite featuring in the version of events given to the police by the 
accused, this was the last time that this cultural/religious discourse 
appeared in the official documents. No reference was made to it during 
the session trial, either in oral interactions or in written records. It did not 
therefore prejudice or contradict the defence’s successive juridical 
strategies; neither was it binding for the accused, nor did it infl uence 
arguments during the trial. As we will see, not only did the defence 
lawyer attempt to show that no cannabis had been found in the house but 
also that no police officers had ever been there.  
 
The Trial: The Orality Stage  
 
The ethnographic observations regarding the case presented here began 
at the time of the trial itself, which was held at the Session Court in 2010, 
almost one and a half years after the case had been registered. During this 
period, after spending three weeks in police custody, the father and son 
had been released on bail and had returned to their village.  
 The first time I saw the two men was at the entrance to the court-room 
while they waited for their case to be called. When their turn came, they 
were asked to enter and stand at the back of the courtroom. They looked 
very nervous, heads bent, staring at the floor. For their defence, they had 
hired a lawyer specialized in narcotic cases, a somewhat self-assured man 
who was always keen to tell stories about how he had succeeded in 
unsettling police officers during cross-examinations.  
The prosecutor for the case was the district attorney, the highest 
authority at the Prosecutor Bureau, a rather elegant, sophisticated man in 
his sixties, whose main passion in life was not so much talking about law 
or criminal cases but about spirituality, meditation, and philosophy; 
whenever I called on him to ask about a case, it seemed that he would 
have happily talked for hours about these topics.  
The session judge was a very jovial man, fond of English literature and 
always keen to receive me in his chambra to discuss the cases of the day. 
He liked to recount humorous anecdotes about previous /p.102/ cases, 
which he used to illustrate the dysfunctionality of the Indian judicial 
system. Although he sometimes described sitting in court all day as 
‘boring’, he was a conscientious, hard-working judge. During the trial, he 
took an active part in the proceedings, calling upon his former experience 
as a lawyer to question witnesses directly, especially those who turned 
hostile. The trial began with the presentation of evidence, during which 
the prosecutor’s witnesses were called to the bar to affirm before the judge 
what they had stated during the investigation.8
 
 
Analysis of the subsequent court interactions shows the fluctuating 
value attributed to oral and written testimonies. While witnesses' written 
statements, as reported by the police in the file, need to be confirmed 
orally before the judge, the verbal interactions that take place in Hindi 
during the trial are simultaneously translated into English by the judge 
and written in the form of a first-person narrative from the point of view 
of the witnesses. In his re-transcription of the oral interactions, the defence 
lawyer’s primary concern is that contradictions emerge in the police’s 
version of events and that an alternative version be provided; 9  it is 
essential for the lawyer to ensure that this document is on record in order 
to undermine the story established by the police in their investigation 
accounts. As we shall see, the defence lawyer achieves his ends by asking 
police witnesses for very detailed, trivial information which he puts on 
record in the hope that this may contradict the police’s previous written 
statements or provide accounts that are inconsistent with those of other 
police witnesses during cross-examination.  
At the time of the trial therefore, the evidentiary value of the ‘oral’ 
statement eventually becomes less important than its written 
re-transcription. The most significant oral part of the trial—witnesses' 
testimonies before the judge—paradoxically focuses on recording, i.e., 
writing the evidence. This shift in value between orality and writing will 
emerge in the analysis of courtroom interactions presented hereafter.  
 
The Beginning of the Defence’s Subtext    
 
The first witness to be called to the bar was the patwari, a local land officer. 
Patwaris are commonly summoned to testify in narcotic cases, as they need 
to certify the identity of the person on whose property, /p.103/ i.e., land or 
house cannabis has been found. By questioning the witness, the lawyer 
put on record that the house of one of the accused was joined to his 
brother’s house and that, because his brother was now dead, he and his 
sister-in-law had both inherited his brother’s property. The lawyer also 
put on record that this house was joined to the house of the widow’s 
brother and that the two houses had not been partitioned. Although this 
information may appear insignificant, it was in fact crucial evidence to 
support the lawyer’s version of the facts, which was that the case had been 
completely invented by the police at the instigation of the widow’s 
brother.  
The next witness to appear before the court was a man who owned a 
shop in the village where the accused lived. At the time of the search, one 
of the police officers involved in the raid had asked the shopkeeper to lend 
him weights and a set of scales to weigh the cannabis found in the house 
of the accused. When the shopkeeper reached the bar, the prosecutor told 
him, ‘You tell the truth and do not worry. No mountain will fall upon you. 
Why are you hiding something, and why are you carrying this burden on 
your back?’  
These words were particularly revealing; the prosecutor had evidently 
realized that this witness was now on the side of the accused. The judge 
looked at the prosecutor quizzically, which prompted the prosecutor to 
explain his words—‘This man is hiding and he is not telling the 
truth’—which clearly referred to the brief interaction that the prosecutor 
had had with him before entering the court.10
 
The following is an extract 
from the oral interactions that took place in the courtroom in Hindi and in 
which the witness was expected to say that the police had taken the scales 
and weights to weigh the cannabis:  
Judge: When did it happen [that the police came]? Can you tell us?  
Man: I don’t know.  
Judge: Rack your brains and try to picture when it happened.  
Man: Some men came at eight o’clock and took some weights and scales.  
Judge: How many men were they?  
Man: There were two.  
Judge: Did they give them back to you?  
Man: Yes, they returned them after a while.  
/p.104/ 
Prosecutor: Do you know why they took them?  
Man: I don’t know. 
Prosecutor: (angrily) Why did you come here then? If you do not want to 
say anything, then why come to court?  
 
The prosecutor had presumed that the shopkeeper would say that the 
police officer had told him that the weights and scales he had asked to 
borrow were needed to measure the cannabis found in the house. 
However, the man did not give this information when questioned, and the 
prosecutor did not ask to cross-examine him. The tension between the 
witness and the prosecutor was palpable during this part of the hearing, 
but this did not come across in the record.  
The next witness was a taxi driver who had been hired by the police on 
the day of the search to take them to the village where the accused lived, 
which was situated in the mountains a fair distance from the main road. 
When the prosecutor asked this man to recount what had happened that 
day, the latter stated spontaneously that a CID (Criminal Investigation 
Department) officer, whom he referred to as Shiva Lal, had hired him to 
drive them to the village of the accused. However, this name—Shiva 
Lal—had not been given by the driver at the time of the investigation one 
and a half years earlier. In the police report, the driver had simply 
affirmed that the CID had hired his taxi, without mentioning a name.  
At that stage in the trial, the name Shiva Lal did not rouse any par-
ticular interest in the prosecutor or the judge. No mention of it had ever 
been made in their presence, nor was there any record of it in the case file. 
Moreover, since the name had been given spontaneously by the 
prosecutor’s witness, it appeared to be a completely ‘neutral’ piece of 
information. The judge therefore proceeded to translate into English what 
the witness had said, dictating to the stenographer,‘[On the day of the 
search], a certain Shiva Lal of the CID had taken my taxi to a village 
named Haripur.’ The defence lawyer asked the driver if Shiva Lal was the 
‘widow’s brother’ (the brother of the sister-in-law of one of the accused), 
which the driver confirmed.  
The role that Shiva Lal played in the defence’s version of the events 
would be clearly revealed by the lawyer later in the trial, when the police 
officers were called to the bar. Yet even at this early stage, the defence 
/p.105/ lawyer—as he hinted to me later—was trying to discreetly 
construct the ‘subtext’ of his defence by having a prosecutor witness 
introduce a ‘seemingly' irrelevant piece of information (the name Shiva 
Lal) for the record, information that would ultimately be a crucial part of 
his defence. Such a strategy is sometimes developed beforehand by a law-
yer who may encourage the accused, as the lawyer seemed to infer in this 
case, to persuade a prosecutor’s witness to say something during the trial 
that can later be used to lend weight to the lawyer’s story.11
 
 
 
Witnesses Turning Hostile: The Woman Pradhan  
 
Up until that point in the trial, no witness had been explicitly declared 
hostile. The first real moments of tension occurred during the testimony 
given by the pradhan (president) of the village where the cannabis had 
been found. Before carrying out any search, police officers are 
obliged—according to a provision in the NDPS Act—to contact the village 
pradhan and to involve him or her in the search. Aside from serving as a 
guarantee for the accused, this provision reflects the responsibility that a 
pradhan has assumed within the village in which he or she has been 
elected.12 Despite the major role that pradhans are called upon to play 
during investigations, they are often considered to be unreliable witnesses 
since they come from the same village as the accused. It is often thought 
that, as an elected member from the locality of the accused, the pradhan is 
likely to take sides with the accused and therefore to become a ‘hostile 
witness’ (cf. Berti 2010, 2011).  
The pradhan in the case I attended, a peasant woman in her forties, was 
asked to repeat an oath after the judge: ‘Whatever I say, I will speak the 
truth in all honesty and in accordance with dharma.’ She was then told to 
recount the events that took place on the day of the search, one and a half 
years earlier. In her statement recorded by the police, the pradhan had 
said that she took part in the search and saw that cannabis had been found 
in the house of the accused. Although the statement had been written on 
her behalf by a police officer, she had signed some parts of the paper 
(memo) as required by law. However, the following passages, taken from 
the court dialogues, demonstrate how the pradhan denied each and every 
point in the statement. They also illustrate how the judge assumed an 
active role during the hearing, almost completely taking over from the 
prosecutor. 
/p.106/  
Judge: What happened on that day?  
Pradhan: The police came to our place.  
Judge: Did the police ask you anything [when they asked you to go with 
them]?  
Pradhan: They did not ask me anything.  
Judge: Where did [the police offi  cers] go then?  
Pradhan: They went to Kishan Ram’s house [of the accused].  
Judge: Were you outside?  
Pradhan: Yes, I was outside.  
Prosecutor: Did they tell you anything [about] why they had to go inside?  
Pradhan: They didn’t tell me anything.  
Judge: So why didn’t you stop them? A pradhan can stop the police from 
doing certain things if they don’t inform you of the illegal acts going on 
there. That is the law.  
Pradhan: They [the police] did not tell me anything, though I asked them. 
They just told me that they had to go there [to the house of the accused] 
because they had some work to do.  
 
The pradhan thus denied before the judge what had been written in the 
police statement, namely, that she had been told the reason they wanted to 
search the house of the accused. Her replies were given in a rather pitiful 
tone of voice as if to convey the popular idea that police officers acted 
rudely and abused their positions of power vis-à-vis villagers. Although 
she was questioned many times, she insisted that she had not been told 
anything. The judge then dictated directly in English: ‘At this stage, the 
learned public prosecutor has put forth a request that he be allowed to 
cross-examine the witness, as the witness has resiled from her previous 
statement. Allowed.’ He then began to cross-examine the pradhan, since 
she was now clearly on the side of the accused.13
 
 
 
Judge: The police showed you some papers that you had to read and 
understand before signing.14
 
 
Pradhan: I did not read them because I was in a hurry, as I had to go to a 
wedding.     
/p.107/ 
The judge stared at her incredulously while the prosecutor shook his 
head, baffled. With this reply, the woman completely lost any credibility 
she had had before the court.  
 
Prosecutor: You are a pradhan, and you sign without reading what you 
are signing? How can you do that? Why did you write your signature 
without reading the papers?  
Pradhan: (after some hesitation) We trust the police, and we believe that 
whatever they write is correct. So I signed [the memo].  
 
By trying to provide a plausible answer, the pradhan in fact contra-
dicted what she had alluded to only a few minutes before, that is, to the 
idea that police officers abused their power.  
 
Prosecutor: How much time did you spend there with the police? 
Pradhan: I don’t know.  
Judge: Try to give some idea.  
Pradhan: I am not sure; almost an hour.  
Judge: You are a pradhan—you are sharp-witted, so you must know.  
 
The judge proceeded to test the pradhan with a series of questions that 
had no relation to the case, with the aim of unsettling her.  
 
Judge: Whose marriage was it?  
Pradhan: My aunt’s son’s.  
Judge: What’s his name?  
Pradhan: I’ve forgotten.  
Judge: Was it the girl’s or the boy’s marriage?  
Pradhan: It’s my paternal aunt’s son.  
Judge: What is your aunt’s name?  
 
The woman was quiet for some time; then she quietly uttered a name, 
leading the prosecutor to think that she was lying. 
  
Prosecutor: It took a long time to reply, and after a lot of thought… 
I would be able to give my auntie’s name without any hesitation!  
/p.108/ 
The prosecutor’s comment provoked some laughter in the audience. 
Convinced that the pradhan was lying, the judge continued to ask her for 
details of the wedding. He then started questioning her about the cannabis 
that had been found in the house and about the fact that she was supposed 
to have followed all the police operations. The pradhan denied witnessing 
any such discovery and replied to each question that she did not know 
anything.  
By denying that the police had found cannabis in the house, the woman 
effectively admitted that an unjust arrest had occurred and she had done 
nothing about it. 
 
Prosecutor: Did you file a written complaint that people from your area 
had been taken away by the police for no reason?  
Pradhan: No, I didn’t.  
Prosecutor: Is it not your duty to protect the people of your area?  
Pradhan: Yes—I told them [the police] not to arrest them, but they didn’t 
listen to me.  
 
Although the judge and the prosecutor were visibly convinced that the 
witness was lying, they questioned her as if they believed she were telling 
the truth. This sort of dialogue is very common during cross--
examinations; the person asking the questions follows the logic of the 
respondent in order to expose gaps in his/her arguments, even though the 
questioner thinks that the witness is lying.  
Referring to the police report, the judge and the prosecutor proceeded 
by asking the pradhan to confirm her version of events as recorded in the 
statement she gave to the police when the cannabis was discovered in the 
house of the accused.  
 
Judge: When the search took place inside the house, a packet was found 
on the first floor, hidden in a cupboard on the veranda.  
Pradhan: No, nothing was found there.  
Judge: While checking that packet, cannabis was found there in the form 
of long sticks.  
Pradhan: I did not see it.  
 
/p.109/  
The judge dictated ‘It is incorrect that on searching the house of the 
accused, the police found a packet kept concealed in a cupboard on the fi 
rst floor, and on taking the said packet, cannabis in the shape of sticks was 
found; nor did I state this to the police’ (Court record, 2010). Then, still in 
English, he dictated various passages from the pradhan’s statement that 
had previously been recorded by the police in order to highlight 
contradictions with her present assertions. These passages were added as 
an aside after each reply from the pradhan before the court under the 
heading ‘(Confronted with statement [police reference] in which it is 
recorded)’.15
 
 
This way of recording the evidence produces a narrative in which, 
paradoxically, the person speaking repeatedly denies what she says. In 
fact, the main aim of the questions is not to elicit a reply from the witness, 
but rather to orally ‘reconstruct’ and rewrite in English what has been 
recorded in the police report. Thus, when the judge decided that the 
pradhan needed to be cross-examined, he in a sense implicitly re-
established the police report's authority.16
 
 
Compared to the aforementioned police diary, the police report is 
seemingly more binding. Its contents can be used during the trial as a 
starting point when questioning a witness, and can also serve as a mirror 
to make the witness contradict themselves. In principle, the ‘oral’ version 
of events provided by the witness and subsequently written in the court 
record is considered to be more valuable in terms of legal evidence than 
what is written in the police report. However, as we have seen, in the case 
where the reply given by the witness to the court contradicts what they 
supposedly said to the police during the investigation, this contradictory 
statement will be added in brackets to the recording of the oral reply 
preceded by the formula ‘Confronted with…’  
At the end of the cross-examination, the judge finally said to the 
pradhan, ‘Look, you are protecting them because they are your supporters 
and you are doing this to win their votes.’ The pradhan then replied: ‘No, 
they are not my supporters. They are from the other party.’  
The judge dictated for the record in English: ‘It is correct that the 
accused are of my panchayat. It is incorrect that they are my supporters. 
Self-stated that they are supporters of the other party. It is incorrect that I 
have received consideration from the accused and that for that reason I am 
telling a lie.’ (Court record, 2010).  
/p.110/  
Referring to the electoral link between the accused and the witness is a 
typical way of concluding a hearing with a village pradhan. It is a stan-
dard formula added at the end of the court interaction to intimate that the 
witness is telling a lie and to provide a motive for this. In the case dis-
cussed here, both the judge and the prosecutor were convinced that in 
addition to winning the vote of the accused, the pradhan had received 
money from them. Yet, the electoral reference was a conventional form of 
recording the fact that the pradhan had turned hostile. Moreover, 
although there was no direct reference during the hearing to any money 
that the pradhan may have received, the term ‘consideration’ used by the 
judge in recording the evidence tacitly suggested such a deal.  
While the judge and the prosecutor used the cross-examination to 
‘rewrite’ the police report entirely (using the formula Confronted with…), 
the defence lawyer based his argument on it. He again, referred to Shiva 
Lal, the CID (Criminal Investigation Department) officer whom the taxi 
driver had identified as the man who had hired him on the day of the 
search. He asked the pradhan to confirm the taxi driver’s assertion that 
this Shiva Lal was the brother of the sister-in-law of one of the accused, 
which the pradhan confirmed. She was also asked to confirm that this 
woman, now a widow, continued to live in her husband’s house, which 
she shared with the family of the accused. After the pradhan had verified 
these statements, the cross-examination was transcribed in the court 
record as follows: ‘It is correct that Shiva Lal, a CID official, is the brother 
of the widow of Hira Singh. It is correct that the relations of the family of 
the accused and the family of Hira Singh are strained. Self-stated that they 
are living separately but in the same house. Inside the house, there is no 
partition’ (Court record).  
According to the subtext to which the lawyer was alluding before the 
court, Shiva Lal had instigated his sister, who shared a house with the 
accused, to lodge a false case against them. The lawyer prompted the 
pradhan to state that all the signatures on the police report were false. He 
also showed the judge one of her signatures that had apparently been 
added between two lines by the police, with no serial number. All these 
replies were translated into English and put on record as the judge 
dictated them.  
At the end of the pradhan’s hearing, the judge stared at the woman and 
addressed her in Hindi in a grave tone of voice: ‘Look, it is your fi rst time 
as village president. If you have told the truth before the court, you /p.111/ 
will get good results [tera udhar ho jayega]. Otherwise, if you have told a lie, 
you have ruined your karma.[…] The police have done their work, and if 
you have made a false statement, then you have done yourself wrong.’  
The judge’s reference to a moral or religious order brought the hearing 
to a close. This kind of assertion does not have the same judicial value as 
the standard forms of accusation delivered in English at the end of a 
cross-examination so that they might be put on record. Although the latter 
are not usually intended for the witnesses themselves (most of whom 
cannot understand English), but rather for those reading the fi le at a later 
stage (e.g., appeal judges), the moral judgements are addressed 
exclusively to the witnesses and are not put on record.  
 
On the Lookout for Police Contradictions    
 
The issue of truth that emerged in the pradhan’s testimony cropped up 
again at the beginning of the police hearings. At this stage, the defence 
lawyer used the cross-examination to undermine the police officers’ 
credibility and to show that they had entirely invented the case. He asked 
for extremely detailed information that was aimed not so much at 
explaining the reasons why the case had been fabricated than at increasing 
his chances of finding contradictions.17 Here, the ‘proof of truth’ lay in a 
systematic search for minor elements of divergence between what had 
previously been written in the report and how the officers replied to the 
lawyer and the judge, as well as between the replies each of these officers 
gave before the court.  
The lawyer’s attack on the credibility of the police began during the 
cross-examination of the first police witness who had taken part in the 
raid. During the cross-examination, he fired a long list of detailed 
questions at the witness in order to fit each event into an exact timetable: 
What time did you leave there? Were you all together from the very 
beginning, or did you pick up people on the way? At what time did you 
reach the place? How many villages did you stop in and at what time? 
Where did you stop to take tea? At what time did the inspector write the 
grounds of belief, and where did he write it? Who brought the grounds of 
belief to CID headquarters? Did they come back afterwards? At what time 
did you get back to headquarters, how, and with whom?  
/p.112/  
To be most effective, the lawyer asked these questions very quickly, 
using a tone of voice to suggest that the officer had invented the whole 
story. This strategy has a cumulative effect: the more the lawyer succeeded 
in undermining the policeman’s credibility, the easier it was for him to 
discredit the other officers. During the long question-and-reply sequences, 
each of which is routinely translated and dictated by the judge to the 
stenographer, the lawyer managed to slip an important detail into the 
dictation or to frame a sentence to his liking, since his expertise lies in 
memorizing any minor detail that is likely to contradict the police officer’s 
replies.18
 
 
Doubt was cast on the truthfulness of the police version when the first 
officer called to the bar was asked to recall the time at which the inspector 
had received the information that the witness had cannabis in his house. 
Significantly, the officer's answer did not match the timing written in the 
report. After asking which of the two times was correct, the lawyer, in an 
accusatory tone of voice, promptly dictated on his behalf in English: ‘My 
today’s testimony is correct, whereas the time of receipt of secret 
information written in seizure memo is incorrect.’ Many other replies 
contradicted the report and therefore, on many occasions, the lawyer was 
able to put on record that the report made at the time of the investigation 
was incorrect.19
 
 
At the end of the cross-examination, the lawyer dictated to the ste-
nographer some concluding sentences in English without having asked 
the witness any questions:  
 
It is incorrect that all the papers were prepared later on in the police 
station just to comply with the provisions of the Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substance Act. It is wrong to suggest that the case has been 
planted upon the accused by the police in connivance with Shiva Lal. It is 
wrong to suggest that the taxi was hired by Shiva Lal. It is incorrect that I 
am deposing falsely. (Court record, 2010)  
 
This kind of declaration serves to summarize the lawyer’s version of 
events through the witness’s denial of what the lawyer appeared to be 
stating. This is common practice in court; it allows the lawyer to put 
forward his account without giving the accused any opportunity to 
respond.  
Once the police’s credibility had been questioned, the judge himself 
seemed to be in a dubitative frame of mind. When the second police 
officer came to the bar to be cross-examined, the judge asked him a /p.113/ 
series of questions: Where were you patrolling that day? Who was with 
you? When did you arrive at the house? What did you and the other 
officers find, and where did you find it? Who took the cannabis, and what 
did they do with it? How many seals did they put on the samples?  
The atmosphere in the court had started to change: it was clear that the 
judge now mistrusted the police officers, and was disappointed in their 
work. Meanwhile, the accused, though unable to follow the English part of 
the dialogue, appeared to be a little more relaxed, and had moved slightly 
nearer to the bar to follow the interactions more closely. They now dared 
to show their faces to the judge, although nobody addressed them directly. 
The situation definitely shifted in their favour with the introduction of the 
next police witness, after whose testimony the whole case collapsed. The 
young man (another CID officer) looked terrified. By the time he entered 
the courtroom, the judge was already visibly annoyed by the turn of 
events, which served to unsettle him even more. The judge began by 
asking the officer to give precise information, such as the names of the 
other officers involved and the registration plate of the taxi hired by the 
police, to which the young man, panicking, responded by trying discreetly 
to read some notes he had written on the palm of his hand. As people 
around him began to laugh, making him more nervous, the judge changed 
his attitude and addressed the man calmly: ‘You have written on your 
hand, so read it and look at the words properly.’ The witness told the 
judge that the officers had stopped at some places on the way to the house 
of the accused, but when the judge asked for the names of the places, he 
looked confused and kept quiet. ‘This is useless! He never went there’, 
commented the defence lawyer.  
Sensing that he was getting embarrassed, the judge addressed the 
young man in a sympathetic tone of voice  
 
Judge: Do you feel sick?  
Man: Yes, I do.  
Judge: What’s the problem?  
Man: I’ve got high blood pressure.  
Judge: Since when? Don’t be scared and don’t get embarrassed. Make 
yourself at home. Be happy. Why are you scared? It is a good thing that 
you seized the cannabis. Just tell us what happened there.  
 
/p.114/  
The judge was now convinced that the case was hopeless, but he did 
not want to stress the young man any further. The officer continued to 
give contradictory replies. ‘All my witnesses are now working for the 
lawyer!’ the prosecutor exclaimed scornfully.  
When the defence lawyer’s turn came to cross-examine the witness, he 
began by stating for the record that the man had written something on his 
hand: ‘It is correct that the name of the officers, the vehicle number, and 
the timing have been written by me on my hand for remembrance.’ He 
then attempted to elicit from the officer every single detail about the way 
the investigations had been conducted and completed the 
cross-examination by dictating a few sentences in English, still from the 
point of view of the witness but this time without even asking him any 
relevant questions.  
However, these sentences are preceded by ‘It is correct that’ or ‘It is 
incorrect that’, depending on whether the person asking the question 
thinks that the witness would deny or confirm his statement.20
 
Thus, the 
dictation for the young officer’s cross-examination reads as follows: ‘It is 
incorrect that no contraband was recovered from the house of the accused. 
It is also incorrect that I was not with the police party on that day. It is 
incorrect that Shiva Lal, the CID official, was with us on that day. It is 
incorrect that I am deposing falsely, being an official. It is incorrect that a 
false case has been set up against the accused’ (Court record, 2012). By 
putting these set phrases on record, the lawyer‘s aim was to suggest that 
the exact opposite was true: no contraband was recovered from the house 
of the accused, and the police officer who was testifying was not with the 
team of policemen on that day (and was thus lying). He also wanted to put 
on record that Shiva Lal, the CID officer, was with these policemen on the 
day of the search, which would have supported his theory that orders for 
the raid had been given by him.21
 
The police officer who was testifying 
was most probably unaware of the lawyer’s strategy to build the ‘widow’s 
brother complot’ theory. This explains why he denied what the lawyer 
asked him—that Shiv Lal was with the team of policemen on the day of 
the search. Instead of weakening the lawyer’s theory, his denial seemed to 
reinforce the general perception that the police were lying because the 
officer was contradicting what the taxi driver had previously stated.  
After this last cross-examination, and even though there were more 
witnesses waiting to testify, the judge proceeded with the resolution of 
/p.115/ the case. He suggested that the prosecutor close the evidence and 
fix the date for the arguments; clearly, he had already reached a decision 
and was intent on not wasting any more time. ‘Now it’s time for 
arguments, not for witnesses’, he said bitterly.  
The analysis of the interactions, therefore, shows how contrary to the 
pradhan’s testimony discussed previously, the police’s loss of credibility 
did not lead to these officers being declared hostile. This reveals a major 
difference in the way the officers’ statements, on the one hand, and the 
pradhan’s, on the other, were perceived as untrue by the court. The police 
officers did not present a completely new version of events, as the pradhan 
had done by saying, for example, that nothing had been recovered from 
the house of the accused. The difference between the officers’ oral 
testimonies and the previous report, which they had produced 
themselves, concerned the details of the investigative procedure. Yet 
without actually being declared hostile, the police officers contradicted 
their own report and therefore invalidated the accusation even more than 
the pradhan had done by turning hostile.  
The preceding discussion reveals how the position of power that police 
officers enjoy during the investigations may be completely overturned at 
the time of the trial, when their words—both written and oral—may be 
challenged and even ridiculed. In addition, this case study exemplifies 
how the courtroom may become a hostile environment for police officers 
in instances where the judge begins to side with the defence lawyer rather 
than the prosecutor. While some police officers appear to be somewhat 
used to the kind of pressure one experiences when interacting with legal 
specialists, others, like the young man described above, feel very uneasy in 
court and can end up completely destroying the police’s credibility.  
     
 
Out-of-Court Discussion About the Case    
 
The lawyer for the accused did not provide any defence witnesses. 
Instead, he strengthened his counter-story for the case using the questions 
he had put to prosecution witnesses and the techniques he had used 
during cross-examination. In his version of the events, Shiva Lal appeared 
to be a crucial figure. On the one hand, he was presented as an accomplice 
in a plot organized by Kishan Ram’s widowed sister-in-law, who wanted 
to stop sharing her husband’s property. On the other hand, /p.116/ he was 
presented as a CID officer, which could explain why he had been able to 
convince the CID inspector to order a raid on the property of the accused.  
As a matter of fact, since the defence lawyers' version of the story had 
not been taken seriously by anyone, no one had taken the trouble to check 
whether Shiva Lal was really a CID officer or even whether he really 
existed. While the case was pending, I had a particularly interesting 
conversation with the judge in his chambra. ‘Shiva Lal?’ he exclaimed. 
‘That’s just the defence’s story! This name does not appear anywhere in 
the statements. The taxi driver made up the name of this man during the 
hearing because he had sided with the accused.’ The judge explained to 
me that the lawyer had to provide a story in order to ‘problematize his 
case’, and that the tale about Shiva Lal most probably filled this role. He 
did not seem particularly bothered about this. ‘We are concerned with the 
main witnesses,’ he explained, ‘which in this case are police officers, and 
the police officers have contradicted themselves a lot. Two of them have 
said that one of the officers was not present; others have said that he was. 
This contradiction has cast doubt on the presence of some police officers at 
the scene.’ What he, as a judge, was required to consider, he told me, was 
whether the accused was fully aware that there was cannabis at his 
property. ‘You must have noticed that the defence has laid out the case 
based on the fact that the house is joined to another house and that the 
widow of the brother of one of the accused also resides there’, he 
remarked. ‘The prosecution was bound to prove that the house was not 
the joint property of the other family members. If this is not proved, the 
possibility that some other persons residing in the house could have kept 
the cannabis there cannot be ruled out’.  
The prosecutor, who was very disappointed in the police officers, did 
not seem to lend much importance to Shiva Lal either. When I went to see 
him in his office, he was waiting for a visit from the state inspector who 
had investigated the case and whom he had invited for a meeting. The 
inspector, who had recently retired, was required to appear in court as a 
witness the following day, and the prosecutor wanted to bring him up to 
date regarding the situation. Upon the inspector’s arrival, the prosecutor 
handed him the investigative report and started listing the many errors 
that the inspector had committed. The inspector looked puzzled and 
muttered some vague excuses, but he put forward no real argument.  
/p.117/  
The prosecutor’s first reproach concerned the ‘search warrant’ that the 
officer had sent to the deputy police superintendent via a constable in 
order to proceed with the search without waiting for the warrant issued 
by the magistrate. Instead of using Section 42 of the NDPS Act (about 
searching property), the inspector had used Section 50, which deals with 
questions and answers. Moreover, although he had written the ‘grounds 
of belief ’ and had sent it to his superior officer, the inspector had 
forgotten to add the disclaimer that there was ‘no time to wait for court 
authorization, as there is the risk that the cannabis might be hidden or 
thrown away’ (section 42d NDPS Act). ‘I don’t know whether it’s out of 
ignorance or what,’ remarked the prosecutor rather disappointedly, 
addressing the inspector, ‘but this is mandatory procedure. Otherwise, 
this document [the grounds of belief] is just wastepaper. For three days, I 
have been ridiculed in court because of you.’  
Trying to reassure the inspector, the prosecutor added, ‘Okay, what’s 
done is done. Now it’s too late, but I tell you that I am incapable of prov-
ing the offence.’ However, the prosecutor continued to admonish the 
inspector, listing other failings; for instance, the name of the pradhan had 
been added to the list of witnesses with no serial number. ‘You put her 
name there without a number’, he began ‘That looks as if you added her 
name later, and in the court she denied that this signature is hers. There is 
no sign under the carbon and no number anywhere. Now, you see, we can 
neither explain these things nor can we withdraw it all because this is the 
original document.’  
The prosecutor’s third criticism of the investigation concerned the 
alleged timing of events. In the police report, the time at which the police 
had received the tipoff was listed as 7:30 a.m., but the time at which they 
had sent the ‘grounds of belief’ was 6:35 a.m.—nearly an hour earlier! 
‘What’s the meaning of all this?’ the prosecutor cried. ‘Why do you put the 
time then? It is not necessary to put it.’ Finally, he mentioned the raiding 
party: ‘Let me say that bringing ten men for a raid is not an intelligent 
thing to do. They will make a lot of contradictions before the court. Two or 
three men are enough.’ The prosecutor again mitigated his censure by 
adding, ‘Okay, it’s too late now’. He reminded the inspector that the 
following day he would have to explain all of these issues to the judge 
and, even more distressingly, to the defence lawyer. He told the inspector 
to take the fi le with him and to read it at home at his leisure.  
/p.118/  
The inspector left the office with the file under his arm, and after a time 
another officer entered. He was the deputy police superintendent, the 
inspector’s superior officer, a more self-confident, well-educated man. The 
following day, he too would have to appear before the judge to be 
questioned about why he had not stopped the investigations once he 
realized that the document the inspector sent him was not accurate. 
Speaking in Hindi mixed in with a number of English expressions, he 
apologized many times to the prosecutor, saying that he had given full 
instructions to his ‘men’—the inspector and others—and had told them to 
draft the documents in a certain way, yet despite his instructions they had 
done it all wrongly. ‘I was so shocked on seeing that report’, he said. ‘I 
thought about going to beat them up! Actually, I really reprimanded him 
[the inspector], but what was to be done? In fact, I never punished him.’ ‘I 
know’, said the prosecutor. ‘I’m also like that.’  
‘I was really very upset, really very upset’, continued the deputy 
superintendent. ‘I didn’t know what action I could take without com-
pletely destroying the inspector's career. I didn’t do anything because he 
was about to retire. Actually, sir, you know this. We don’t have a good 
investigating officer. Those who investigate are not there all the time, so 
you can’t always give full instructions.’  
The interactions I have just described need to be contextualized within 
the institutional relationship between prosecutors and police officers. 
Since 1973, Indian police have operated separately from the prosecutor 
agency and have had complete control over investigations. Although some 
high-ranking police officers have offices inside the district court complex 
and even, in some district courts, just next door to the prosecutor’s office, 
the prosecution is not supposed to intervene in investigations until the 
challan (charge sheet) has been prepared. In most cases, investigations are 
carried out in the field by lower-ranking officers (so-called non-gazetted 
officers) who are monitored by their superiors (gazetted officers). In the 
case study presented here, we have seen how operations were led in the 
field by the inspector; he had sent the grounds of belief to his superior 
officer, and, as was stated in court, the operation was already over when 
this superior officer reached the house of the accused. He also left the 
scene of the crime before the raid party had completed its task. As he 
explained to the prosecutor, by the time he realized that there were 
mistakes in the document it was too late: ‘I could neither change the 
document nor explain the mistakes’.22
 
 
/p.119/  
Police officers do not usually have solid excuses for their mistakes 
when they are face to face with a prosecutor. I had the opportunity to 
converse with some CID officers at their headquarters and it was obvious 
that they had far more to say in their defence there and then than in court. 
They particularly criticized a defence lawyer’s habit of systematically 
declaring that all cases are fictitious. As one officer explained in Hindi, 
‘They always say that we arrested the accused for no reason, that we 
didn’t draw the map straightaway, and that all the documents were in fact 
prepared at the police station. This is a total waste of time.’ The officers 
also complained about the delay between the investigations and the trial 
and about the conditions under which they had to testify before the court:  
 
When I’m called to give my testimony, I arrive at the court one hour 
before and I have only one hour to read the file. I am asked before the 
court—but I can’t remember the small details of the case—what time I 
was present and what I was doing there and things like that. I can’t re-
member all that. The defence lawyer will asks how far it is from that 
place, and how many houses there are in that village, and how far it is 
from another place, and he’ll proceed with a cross-examination. I’ll tell 
him everything because I drew the map, so I’ll tell him everything, and 
after that he’ll want more information on very minor questions that I 
cannot give, especially when the case is two or three years old or even 
more.  
 
 
 
The Defence Version Prevails    
 
After all the evidence had been presented, both the inspector and the 
superintendent of police were cross-examined at length by the defence 
lawyer, but this had no further impact on the prosecutor’s case. By this 
point everyone was convinced that the prosecutor had lost the case and 
that the accused were going to be acquitted. Subsequently, the accused 
were examined under Section 313 of the Code of the Criminal Procedure. 
This is the only moment in a trial, when the accused has the opportunity 
to express themselves before the bench. However, in most cases this part 
of the trial does not lead to any great surprises. The questions for the 
witnesses are prepared beforehand, and begin with ‘It has come in the 
prosecution evidence led against you that […the charges are listed]. What 
have you to say about […]?’ The replies are usually very standard, with 
the accused systematically stating, ‘It is incorrect’, /p.120/ ‘It is wrong’, or 
‘I don’t know’. It is only at the end of the series of questions that the 
replies may include some supplementary information to sum up the 
defence’s general theory. In weak cases, where the prosecutor has failed to 
prove the case, the statement of the accused is a mere formality. In the case 
discussed here, for example, the statement was even taken in the 
stenographer’s office with only the lawyer, the prosecutor, and the 
accused present.  
Apart from denying all the points raised in the questions, the accused 
stated that no cannabis had been found in their house and that they had 
been framed by the police at the request of Shiva Lal, who was working in 
the Criminal Investigation Department’ (Court record 2010). We have seen 
how this version of the events was overlooked during the trial; even when 
the defence lawyer, by questioning the pradhan, explicitly disclosed how 
Shiva Lal was crucial to his counter-narrative of events, the role of this 
man and even his very existence had not been challenged by the 
prosecutor. The attorney’s team even considered my efforts to look into 
the matter to be a total ‘waste of time’.  
Yet the ‘Shiva Lal story’ was to be unexpectedly put forward as a fully 
legitimate account by the judge who ruled to acquit the accused. In his 
twenty-five-page judgment, after recalling in detail the main logic behind 
the defence’s ‘complot theory’, the judge wrote,  
 
By whom the taxi was hired remained a mystery. One police witness said 
under oath that the taxi had been hired by the inspector, but this version 
has been contradicted by the taxi driver, who said that his taxi was hired 
by a man called Shiva Lal, of the C.I.D.  
 
The judge then continued as follows:  
 
The said contradiction apparently does not appear of much signifi cance, 
but if read in conjunction with the defence set up on behalf of the accused 
[the ‘complot’s theory’], it has become most significant. (Court record, 
2010)    
 
At the beginning of his judgment, the judge had merely referred to the 
‘Shiva Lal story’ as a possible reason why the accused ‘may have been 
falsely implicated in the case.’ Nevertheless, this story ultimately proved 
to be crucial for him in providing the case with a narrative logic.  
It should be noted that the ‘complot theory’ is constantly used by the 
defence lawyer in criminal cases. The potential impact of such a theory 
/p.121/ on a judicial decision increases if the case is referred to an appeal 
court. After all, it is in the interest of the defence lawyer at the trial to 
make reference to an ‘enemy’, whether real or invented. In fact, should a 
case go to appeal, this type of issue may raise doubts in the judge’s mind, 
but only if it had been put on record during the trial.23
 
 
During the trial discussed above, not only had the defence lawyer but 
also the judge cross-examined the police witnesses at length in order to 
discern contradictions between their testimonies. In his ruling, the judge 
underlined every detail of the incongruities in the accounts provided by 
the police officers when they were questioned at the bar. ‘The said 
contradictions,’ he wrote many times in his text, ‘have rendered doubtful 
the presence, manner, and mode of the [police] proceedings from the 
headquarters [to the house of the accused] in the manner set up by the 
prosecution’. He also emphasized the problem of the joint ownership of 
the house where the cannabis had been found, which prevented the 
prosecutor from proving ‘that the charas [cannabis] in question had been 
found in the possession of the accused and no one else […] as a result of 
which the prosecution has miserably failed to prove that the accused were 
found in exclusive and conscious possession of the contraband in 
question’ (Court report, 2010).  
Technical arguments over, for example, procedural errors or contra-
dictions in police stories emerge systematically in narcotic cases which 
lead to many similarities between different investigations. Similarly, the 
‘social’ argument—that there was a conspiracy against the accused—is 
part of a repertoire that is regularly proposed by the defence lawyer. Both 
are forged through cross-examination, although the relevance they may 
acquire varies considerably according to which judge conducts the trial.  
A judge’s personality and the style he adopts in court are important 
variables in determining the direction a trial may take, and both have a 
sizeable influence on the way the evidence is assessed.24
 
During the case in 
question, the judge and the defence lawyer ultimately appeared to be of 
one mind in doubting the police’s version of the story, but other judges 
may have turned the evidence around to suit the prosecution. 25
 
The 
impact of a judge’s attitude on a trial’s outcome is a topic frequently raised 
by defence lawyers, some of whom try to adjust their styles of 
cross-examination to curry favour with the judge. In situations where the 
odds are 50-50, the judge does not generally have a clear idea of the /p.122/ 
verdict when the trial draws to a close, while in the case presented here, 
no one seemed to doubt that the police officers had lost all credibility and 
that the accused would be acquitted.  
Although the police officers had clearly made many mistakes, the final 
verdict was in all likelihood elicited by aspects of the trial that were 
difficult to convey in writing; it relied on a certain court dynamic, on the 
performance of the various protagonists in the trial, and on the power 
relations enacted both inside and outside the courtroom. These aspects, 
which were highly perceptible in the trial setting, are barely traceable in 
the way trial interactions have been put on record. 
  
* * *  
My concern in this chapter has not been so much to understand how 
true the defence or the police story is but rather, by relying on a case 
study, how the notions of ‘truth’ and ‘untruth’ are used and managed in a 
court of law. Kolsky (2010) has shown how the issue of truth was a 
constant concern for the British in India, especially when it came to 
administering justice. Colonial administrators often characterized Indians 
as people who could not ‘distinguish fact from fiction’ or who had a 
‘notorious disregard for truth’ (Kolsky 2010:108–9; see also Lal 1999). The 
case presented here shows how the culturalist discourse on truth is 
reproduced by many Indian judges and prosecutors who cannot help 
stating that Indian people, especially villagers, tell lies before the court.  
The notions of ‘truth’ and ‘fiction’ were constantly evoked in the court 
both by the prosecutor (or the judge) in cross-examining witnesses from 
the village of the accused and by the defence lawyer in cross-examining 
police officers. In order to understand what these notions mean in this 
context we must draw upon what emerged from the details of trial 
interactions as well as from how people involved in the trial understand 
the case outside the court.  
By suggesting that the pradhan was lying, the judge was implicitly 
endorsing the police’s version of events. However, this presumption 
proved to be incorrect; in the follow-up to the hearings, the judge began to 
doubt the credibility of the police story. In fact, due to the police officers’ 
contradictory replies, the very ‘fact’ of their presence in the house of the 
accused was increasingly challenged by the judge, even though /p.123/ this 
in turn contradicted the part of the pradhan’s statement that was thought 
to be true by the judge, that is, that the police had actually gone to search 
the house of the accused.  
As it transpires from the court interactions, the relationship between 
telling the truth and lying was not as Lynch and Bogen note in reference to 
a different case, ‘a simple binary opposition between making true and 
false statements’ (Lynch and Bogel, 1996). The judge was convinced in this 
case that both the pradhan and the police were lying but not about the 
same point: the pradhan was considered to be lying when she said that 
cannabis had not been discovered, and the police officers were considered 
to be lying when they said that they had all taken part in the raid. We may 
note that there is a discrepancy here between what was written in the 
court record and what emerged from the informal discussions. The judge 
dictated in the record that the pradhan was lying for political reasons, 
though he was of the opinion that the woman had received money from 
the accused. On the other hand, the judge did not record the fact that the 
police officers were also telling lies despite his conviction that contrary to 
what they had claimed, some police officers had not taken part in the raid. 
During our informal conversations, the judge told me that the police’s lies 
were due to their desire to make the case appear stronger for the 
prosecution, whereas in his written judgment he supported the defence’s 
version of the story, that the police officers had invented the case on Shiva 
Lal’s request.  
As we have seen, the perception of truth and lies in such contexts relies 
partly on the performative skills of the legal professionals in challenging 
the other party’s version of events, as well as on the witnesses' guile when 
replying while giving evidence—which particularly appeared to work 
against the police in this case.  
Finally, the definition of truth appears to be related to the question of 
whether a previous statement is considered to be legally binding. For 
example, the accused initially admitted that the cannabis in their house 
was for use during religious ceremonies, although this statement was not 
binding—even if reported in the police diary—as far as the outcome of the 
case was concerned. Despite showing implicitly that the police had gone 
to their house and had discovered cannabis, neither the prosecutor nor the 
judge referred to this version of events during the trial. The fact that this 
information was overlooked during the trial may be due in part to the 
somewhat unconventional nature /p.124/ of the so-called ‘police diary’ 
which is often a neglected aspect of the police investigation report. Court 
hearings focus on the report of the witnesses’ statements collected by the 
police during the investigation. Although these statements are said to be 
non-binding for the witnesses, as they have to be confirmed orally, they 
are used as a gauge to evaluate the truthfulness of their replies in court. 
Indeed, the case presented here has revealed the ambiguous value of the 
‘principle of orality’ in Indian criminal procedure. Though a witness’s 
statement must be confirmed orally during the trial, what is taken into 
account by the judge when making his decision—and by higher-level 
courts in the event of an appeal—is only what has been put on record in 
writing during the trial.  
Finally, the case analysed here raises the issue of the importance of 
fiction in the judicial process. By comparing court documents with 
informal discussions, at least three kinds of fictions can be identified. The 
first, commonly attributed to police officers, is interpreted as a way of 
ensuring conformity between investigative practices and the so-called 
technicality of legal provisions. A second fiction is created by villagers 
who, having negotiated with the family of the accused, deny whatever the 
police have written on their behalf in the report. The final fiction is that of 
the defence lawyer, who tries to challenge the police’s version of the story 
not only by undermining the officers’ credibility vis-à-vis the court, but 
also by proposing a conventional social scenario—that of a family 
conspiracy—which has ultimately been accepted by judges as the possible 
truth.  
 
Notes 
1 Tribune News Service ‘Chief Justice for steps to check drug menace’, The Tribune 
(Himachal Pradesh edition), Shimla, March 27, 2010. http://www. 
tribuneindia.com/2010/20100328/himachal.htm#6, 26/06/2014.  
2 This kind of official meeting is an occasion for people dealing with criminal cases 
in their everyday work to discuss issues in a more analytical way. The Narcotic 
Drugs Act is a topic frequently chosen by the Academy, which shows that judges 
are aware of the problems involved in the Act’s implementation.  
3  Chauhan, Kuldeep ‘Where devta tells them to grow cannabis.’ The Tribune 
(Himachal Pradesh edition), 27 July 2004.  
4  Chauhan, Kuldeep,‘Hardships multiply for cannabis growers’, The Tribune 
(Himachal Pradesh edition), Shimla, 6 October 2005. http://www. 
tribuneindia.com/2005/20051006/himachal.htm#1 (accessed 29 May 2014) 
/p.125/ 
5 Most of the names used here have been changed.  
6 The diary also contains a step-by-step account of the actions undertaken by the 
accused while they were in custody: when they ate, dates of medical 
examinations, whether a guard was present, and so on. The person who made 
the report, who identifies himself by his role (‘I, the inspector, am talking’), 
recorded the names of all the people within the police force who were involved 
in the investigation. Additionally, he provided information on how the fi le con-
cerning the accused was circulated within the police department.  
7 7 . At this stage, the magistrate was authorized to set bail even though he himself 
would not be trying the case; it was to be tried by a higher court because it was 
punishable by more than ten years’ imprisonment.  
8 The prosecutor must select witnesses amongst those put forward by the police.  
9 Most of the time, this alternative story is constructed entirely by the lawyer on 
the basis of his own questions, which are translated and reformulated in English 
in the first person from the point of view of the witness by simply adding the 
 
words ‘It is correct that…’ at the beginning if the witness confirms what the 
lawyer asks, or ‘It is incorrect that…’ in the case where he or she denies it.  
10 The prosecutor meets the witnesses before they enter the courtroom to refresh 
their memories about the information they provided in previous statements.  
11 Negotiations with the prosecutor’s witnesses are carried out not by the lawyer 
but by the accused or his/her family members, who come to the lawyer’s office 
to receive instructions.  
12 According to Section 47 of the NDPS Act, it is the ‘duty of certain officers to 
provide information to any police officer when it may come to his knowledge 
that any land has been illegally cultivated with opium poppies, cannabis plants, 
or coca plants, and every such officer of the government who neglects to give 
such information shall be liable to punishment’. Evidence shows that during the 
colonial period, a similar procedure existed in which a headman from the area 
where the accused lived was brought in to witness the investigation during the 
investigation process (cf. Singha 1998:16).  
13 Although a request to cross-examine a witness is always recorded by the judge 
as coming from the prosecutor, most of the time it is the judge himself who 
decides when to make this request and who actually begins the cross-
-examination. 
14 Here the judge is referring to a part of the police record called memo, which is 
made whenever the police take something from the scene of the crime during 
the investigation. Contrary to the oral statement that witnesses give to the police, 
the memo must be signed by an independent witness.  
/p.126/ 
15 During the cross-examination, the witness was systematically confronted with 
his/her previous statement, which was referred to after every question as a way 
of casting doubt on his/her reply.  
16 This technique recalls what Conley and O’ Barr observed (2005:26) in reference 
to an American context, where they noted that ‘Because each of the tag questions 
is preceded by a statement that is damaging to the witness the answers are 
almost irrelevant. Even if the witness answers in the negative the denial may be 
lost in the flow of the lawyer’s polemic. By controlling question form, the lawyer 
is thus able to transform the cross-examination from dialogue into self-serving 
monologue.’  
17 For the use of this cross-examination technique in a UK context, see Good (2004).  
 
18 As a judge explained to me, a good lawyer has to ‘master the file’. However, a 
prosecutor rarely does so because, unlike the defence lawyer, he does not have a 
team of junior lawyers working for him.  
19  One wonders how the officers could actually remember all these details, 
including the exact timing of each operation some eighteen months after the 
report had been written. According to the procedure established by the Indian 
Evidence Act, witnesses (including police officers) are asked to reply without the 
report in front of them, but they may ‘refresh their memories’ by reading the file 
again just before entering the courtroom. What is required of them, therefore, is 
not to accomplish the impossible task of remembering every detail, but to 
succeed in replying to the questions put to them during the trial without 
contradicting what they wrote in their previous report. It is more a performance 
based on the witness’s capacity to reproduce orally what has been written in the 
file than an actual recollection of facts.  
20 Any legal professional in India who reads these sentences, including the appeal 
judge, recognizes that this is the method a lawyer uses to suggest the exact 
opposite of what a witness appears to confirm or deny in the report.  
21 It should be noted that the use of a double negative such as ‘It is incorrect that I 
was not…’ is sometimes confusing even for judges, and some lawyers seem to 
play on this double negative to frame the statement to their advantage.  
22 Although the prosecutor now showed his disappointment in the police, it seems 
that he himself had not noticed all the technical mistakes before approving the 
challan that needed to be filled in at the session court. As reported in Chapter 4 of 
the prosecutor manual, one of the prosecutor’s tasks is to ‘scrutinize the final 
investigation report’: ‘In the case where there is non-compliance or where the 
investigation is still incomplete regarding a crucial aspect, the prosecutor will 
bring the matter to the notice of the police superintendent who may order action 
to bridge the gap in investigations’ (Prosecution Manual 2008).  
/p.127/ 
23 A High Court judgment can only be based on information from the trial, which 
means that a recording of the evidence is crucial for reaching an eventual 
resolution of the case. When attending High Court hearings, I noted that the 
judge always asked the lawyer if any enmity between the victim and the accused 
had been mentioned (and recorded) in the trial evidence.  
24 Compare with Conley and O’Barr (1990:108-12).  
25 An extreme example of this comes courtesy of a case conducted by another 
session judge, which was held in the same court as the case presented here. This 
 
judge had very strict rules for recording evidence during the trial: when 
witnesses came to the bar, instead of letting the prosecutor question them, the 
judge immediately began to dictate to the stenographer what the police officers 
had recorded for the witness statement at the time of the investigation. This was 
done in order to reduce the likelihood of a witness turning hostile. His way of 
conducting the trial provoked discontent among the lawyers, who complained 
that they were no longer allowed to cross-examine the witnesses in the manner 
to which they were accustomed. With this new judge, there was barely room for 
a lawyer to propose a conspiracy theory like the ‘Shiva Lal version’. When one 
looks at the decisions taken by this judge on narcotic cases similar to the one 
described here, one finds sentences such as ‘There was not even a suggestion of 
previous hostility of the witnesses of the prosecution with the accused person. 
As such, the possibility of false implication was ruled out’ (State of HP vs [xx], 
2009).  
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